In Washington this week, former President Donald Trump stated that any potential civilian nuclear energy agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia remains strictly dependent on Riyadh normalizing diplomatic relations with Israel. The stance ties advanced U.S. nuclear technology transfers directly to broader Middle Eastern diplomatic realignments, aiming to reshape regional security frameworks. However, the proposal has reignited intense debate among international security experts regarding nuclear proliferation risks across the Persian Gulf.
Background of the U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Negotiations
Saudi Arabia has long sought to develop a domestic nuclear energy infrastructure to diversify its economy away from oil under its Vision 2030 framework. The kingdom holds significant native uranium reserves and seeks U.S. technical assistance, nuclear reactors, and fuel supply contracts to build its civilian energy grid.
Historically, Washington has required foreign partners to sign a formal “123 Agreement,” named after Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act. This legal framework establishes strict nonproliferation criteria that foreign nations must meet before receiving U.S. nuclear technology or materials.
The gold standard for these agreements, demonstrated in the 2009 U.S.-United Arab Emirates deal, legally obligates the recipient country to forego domestic uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing. Riyadh, however, has consistently resisted signing agreements that explicitly ban enrichment on Saudi soil, citing national sovereignty and economic autonomy.
Conditionality and the Israeli Normalization Angle
By explicitly linking nuclear cooperation to the normalization of ties with Israel, Washington seeks to expand the scope of the diplomatic framework established by the 2020 Abraham Accords. Proponents argue that bringing Saudi Arabia into formal diplomatic relations with Israel would permanently alter Middle Eastern security dynamics and foster long-term stability.
The strategy uses U.S. security guarantees and civil nuclear technology as leverage to secure a major diplomatic breakthrough for Israel. Israeli officials have expressed mixed reactions, balancing the strategic benefit of formal ties with Saudi Arabia against potential long-term threats to Israel’s qualitative military and technological edge in the region.
Trump asserted that the proposed bilateral arrangement would forbid Saudi Arabia from enriching its own uranium, relying instead on foreign-supplied reactor fuel. This restriction aims to soothe concerns in Washington and Tel Aviv regarding potential dual-use applications of civilian nuclear technology.
Expert Skepticism Over Nonproliferation Guardrails
Despite assurances that domestic enrichment will be prohibited under the proposed deal, nonproliferation analysts warn that the current terms lack necessary enforcement mechanisms. Security experts contend that without explicit, legally binding restrictions written directly into the accord, Saudi Arabia could eventually adapt civilian infrastructure for military purposes.
Arms control researchers emphasize that civil nuclear infrastructure provides knowledge, materials, and technological foundations that can be repurposed over time. Nonproliferation analysts warn that without strict, verifiable guardrails prohibiting all domestic fuel enrichment, any civil deal creates a structural pathway toward potential weapons capability.
The core fear centers on weapons-grade enrichment thresholds, where uranium enriched beyond 90 percent purity can be used for nuclear warheads. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman previously stated in public interviews that if regional rival Iran develops a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia will move to acquire one as well.
Data from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) highlights that transitioning from low-enriched commercial fuel, typically 3 to 5 percent purity, to weapons-grade levels requires minimal structural modifications if centrifuge facilities exist. Consequently, experts argue that mere political assurances do not provide adequate security guarantees without the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, which allows unannounced, intrusive inspections.
Legislative Hurdles and Regional Security Impact
The proposed deal faces a steep uphill battle in the U.S. Congress, where lawmakers from both parties have voiced strong reservations. Any formal 123 Agreement must be submitted to Capitol Hill, where bipartisan coalitions have historically opposed transferring nuclear technology to nations unwilling to sign strict nonproliferation clauses.
If Washington grants Saudi Arabia civil nuclear access without standard safety guardrails, experts warn it could undermine global nonproliferation norms. Neighboring states, including Turkey and Egypt, might feel compelled to demand similar nuclear access, triggering a regional nuclear latent race across the Middle East.
Concurrently, binding nuclear access to Israeli normalization places significant pressure on Saudi leadership, which must balance strategic energy goals against domestic and regional public opinion regarding regional diplomacy.
Key Developments to Monitor
In the coming months, analysts will monitor whether Washington insists on the IAEA Additional Protocol as a non-negotiable prerequisite for any final agreement text. The exact legal language surrounding fuel supply chains and domestic uranium processing will determine whether the agreement satisfies congressional watchdog committees.
Additionally, progress will depend on tri-lateral diplomatic discussions between Washington, Riyadh, and Tel Aviv regarding baseline security guarantees and diplomatic terms. Legislative debates on Capitol Hill will serve as the final decisive test for whether this diplomatic trade-off can withstand domestic political scrutiny.
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